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ABSTRACT
Shopbots and Internet sites that help users locate the best
price for a product are changing the way people shop by
providing valuable information on goods and services. This
paper presents a ¯rst attempt to measure the value of one
piece of information: the price charged for goods and ser-
vices. We ¯rst establish a theoretical limit to the value of
price information for the ¯rst seller in a market that decides
to sell price information to a shopbot and quantify the rev-
enues that the seller can expect to receive. We then proceed
to discuss whether and how much of this theoretical value
can actually be realized in equilibrium settings.
Keywords
shopbots, e-commerce, price dispersion, information value
1. INTRODUCTION
Shopbots and Internet sites that perform comparisons of
prices and product characteristics change the way people
shop for goods and services.
Even though the reduction of consumers' search costs has
caused increased competition among sellers, when compared
with conventional markets of bricks and mortar retailers, the
new Internet economy is far from frictionless and consider-
able and persistent price dispersion exists [2]. This price
dispersion is big enough to make price information valuable
to consumers who are price sensitive and want to compare
prices before buying a good or service.
Traditionally, price information has been provided for free
to potential customers. Even in cases where price informa-
tion was provided to customers through third parties, who
could potentially bene¯t from it, there were no technological
means available to the sellers to either charge these inter-
mediaries for the price information or prevent them from
obtaining it.
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We argue that price information has economic value and
hence should be bought and sold. If shopbots that provide
free services and pro¯t only by selling advertisment space
do not want to pass the cost of price information on to con-
sumers, they will have to share their advertising revenues
with demanding sellers. This will be an issue particularly
in markets with high price dispersion and might lead to the
collapse of the free shopbot model (or, more accurately, the
constant cost model) for these markets.
Two recent papers [3] [1] have considered price informa-
tion on the Internet as a valuable good that can be traded.
Both consider the intermediary selling price information, al-
lowing it to realize some of the added value its service gen-
erates to market participants. Both papers strengthen our
belief that the idea of selling price information has become
plausible with the advent of economically motivated soft-
ware agents.
Our approach di®ers from previous work as we consider
sellers selling price information directly to price sensitive
buyers. This paper is the ¯rst, as far as we know, that con-
nects product prices with the information value they gener-
ate to the seller of the products, and its central contribution
is that it proves that the issue is important in e-commerce
and might in°uence the structure of future internet markets.
We present our model in section 2 and derive the marginal
value of the price information of a single seller that sells
price information, given that other sellers provide their price
information for free. In section 3 we consider multiple sellers
selling price information and drop our model assumption in
section 4 to discuss practical considerations. We conclude
in section 5.
2. MAXIMUM VALUE OF PRICE INFOR-
MATION
Far from following the Bertrand view of markets, where
prices are driven down to marginal cost, products sold on
the Internet demonstrate a signi¯cant and persistent price
dispersion [5]. This paper assumes for simplicity that the
price dispersion on the Internet exists due to the presence
of multiple classes of consumers that value products in di®er-
ent ways and demonstrate distinct shopping behaviors. The
sellers have optimized by selecting a price for their products
that maximizes their revenues across all these classes of con-
sumers. We further assume that one such distinct class is
composed of shopbot users who buy products only based on
price.
We consider a market with N sellers that sell many dif-
Retailers at a Shopbot
Bookstore ISBN Price
AllDirect.com 0156001314 $8.96
A1Books 0156001314 $10.75
Kingbooks.com 0156001314 $11.20
BN.com 0156001314 $12.00
Amazon.com 0156001314 $12.00
Powell's Books 0156001314 $14.00
Fatbrain.com 0156001314 Price Info: 10cents
Table 1: A hypothetical example of a seller charging
for price information through a shopbot
ferent undi®erentiated goods like books, CDs, electronics,
etc. We assume that product prices follow a random dis-
tribution f(x) with a corresponding cumulative distribution
denoted by F (x), constant across time, that is exogenous to
our model, and the same for all sellers.
Prospective buyers know the distribution of the prices in
the market, but do not know which seller is the cheapest for
the particular product they are interested in. They have no
preferences for particular sellers and they are willing to buy
from the one that o®ers the lowest price. For this reason
they shop through a shopbot site that displays the prices
of all sellers in the market for the product that the buyers
specify.
Seller j decides to sell his price information and contracts
the shopbot to deliver information for product availability,
while withholding price information, which is available at an
additional fee. The buyer can click on a button or a link and
get j's price immediately by paying a price p. In Table 1 we
show such a hypothetical agreement between a shopbot and
Fatbrain:com.
There are three distinct entity classes in our market: the
buyers, the sellers and the shopbots. Each class faces a
di®erent problem. We address each of these problems in
turn.
2.1 The shopper’s problem
The buyers have three choices: they either pay for the
additional price, do not pay but simply accept the lowest
price among the remaining N ¡ 1 sellers without bothering
to learn j's price, or incur a ¯xed cost of inconvenience c,
assumed to be the same for all buyers, to visit the seller
website directly. Assuming that the buyers are rational,
they will want to learn seller j's price if they expect that
the cost reduction would be more than the cost of acquiring
the price quote. Given that the minimum price for the good
among the remaining N¡1 sellers is q, the buyer knows that
the expected decrease in the minimum price from another
search is equal to:
g(q) =
Z q
0
(q ¡ x)f(x)dx (1)
She is willing to pay j0s price information price, p, to learn
j's price if p < g(q) and p < c. If p > g(q) and c > g(q)
the buyer is better o® by purchasing the item priced at q
without requesting any additional information. Finally, if
c < g(q) and c < p, the buyer will visit j's website directly
to learn j's price.
2.2 The seller’s problem
Seller j's problem is how to price his price information
to maximize revenue. Buyers have queried the shopbot site
and found that the current lowest price for the product they
require is q, where q follows some distribution1 f
(N¡1)
1 (x)
that depends on f(x) and the number of other sellers, N¡1.
The seller can safely set the price of his price information
to ² below g(q), given by equation 1, knowing that rational
buyers will always want to know his price. However, j can-
not charge more than c, the inconvenience cost to the buyer
of visiting j's website directly. So, the seller would set his
price to be p(q) = min(g(q); c). The expected revenue per
customer for seller j from selling price information as ² goes
to zero is thus:
¦ =
Z 1
0
f
(N¡1)
1 (q)p(q)dq (2)
It is interesting to estimate how much an online bookstore
would be able to charge for its price information to shopbots
or shopbot users. We use internet book price dispersion
data, including all costs (shipping etc.), collected in [2] and
assume that all books follow the same price distribution.
That means that our results would be an underestimate in
the cases of books that exhibit higher price dispersion than
the average, and an overestimate for the books that have
lower than average price dispersion. We have ¯tted the au-
thors' de-meaned experimental data with the normal price
distribution with mean zero and standard deviation two.
For the shopper session described in table 1, which is a
representative case of price dispersion, described well by the
normal distribution with standard deviation 2, the shopper
has discovered a minimum price of $8:96. The expected
gain that a shopper would have from knowing one additional
price is p($8:96), close to 9.8 cents. The seller could charge
just below 9.8 cents for this book's price, to make sure that
rational shoppers would pay.
The average revenue per buyer, the seller would expect
from selling price information in this market with seven sell-
ers is, from equation 2, approximately 15.6 cents per shop-
per, assuming alternative search cost c = 50 cents2 to learn
a price. For 20 sellers the expected revenue per buyer drops
to 4.3 cents.
If seller j prices his price information with the method
suggested above, a rational buyer will always request seller
j's price information. So, seller j makes the revenues de-
scribed by equation 2 every time a consumer uses the shop-
bot. We use the term \multiplicative e®ect" to refer to the
fact that a buyer requires multiple price quotes for a single
purchase. Conversely, a seller would potentially be selling
price information more often than products. For example
in a market of seven bookstores, assuming each bookstore
is equally likely to carry a cheapest book, each bookstore
is expected to make 1/7 of total sales. If a seller is the
only one that sells price information, pricing according to
equation 1, rational buyers would always purchase this in-
formation. So for an average price information price of 15.6
cents, the bookstore's price information would on average
generate $0:156 £ 7 = $1:092 per book that the bookstore
sells.
1This is simply the 1st order statistic, the distribution of the
lowest value in N ¡ 1 draws from distribution f , f (i)1 (y) =
i(1¡ F (y))i¡1f(y).
2Based on a back of the envelope calculation for what 2
minutes of time worth to the average shopper, given today's
US salaries.
2.3 The shopbot’s problem
The problem that the shopbots face is whether or not to
accept an arrangement with a seller that wishes to sell price
information. In our model, shopbots that compete for buyer
tra±c would be better o® accepting the arrangement than
providing data only from sellers that provide it for free. This
is because a shopbot that would provide both free and for
fee data would give buyers more options: a buyer visiting
this shopbot would have all the information available at the
shopbots that only provide the free price quotes plus an
option to purchasing additional price quotes. The buyer is
thus strictly better o® visiting the shopbot with the extra
option.
3. SELLER COMPETITION
In this section we present a model where all sellers charge
money to reveal their price.
We consider a shopbot that displays price information of
N di®erent sellers that sell many di®erent undi®erentiated
goods. Again, product prices follow a random distribution
f(p) with the equivalent cumulative distribution denoted by
F (p), constant across time, that is exogenous to our model.
Shopbot users know the distribution of the prices in the
market, but do not know which seller is the cheapest for
the particular product they are interested. They have no
preferences for particular sellers and they are willing to buy
from the one that o®ers the lowest price.
3.1 The shopper’s problem
In the extreme case where all sellers charge for price in-
formation, the prospective shopper cannot ¯nd any shopbot
that provides price information for free. The optimal con-
sumer behavior has been explored in the economic literature.
For a review see [4]. The buyer would keep searching as long
as the expected decrease in the minimum price for another
search is less than what the buyer has to pay for it. If the
buyer believes that all the product prices follow the same
distribution, the search would start from the prices that are
cheaper to acquire. We assume that if two price information
prices are the same, the buyer chooses one at random. If the
current minimum price is q, then the expected decrease in
the minimum price from another search is a function of q
and F , as described by equation 1, above.
The shopper would start by requesting price information
on the products that is cheaper to acquire and stop when
the lowest price p requested by a seller to reveal price infor-
mation is greater than the expected marginal product price
decrease: p > g(q). The optimal sequential decision rule
is for the shopper to continue searching if the lowest price
observed up to that point is greater than R, where R is the
solution to g(R) = p.
3.2 The seller’s problem
The ¯rst problem a seller would face, in a market for price
information, is knowing the product prices of competitors,
which would not be available for free to shopbots or price-
comparison web sites. Instead of incurring this cost, a seller
might choose to buy only price information for some of the
competitors products and make price information pricing
decisions based on estimates of product price dispersion.
Or, sellers may provide price information to a shopbot that
would then sell it to potential buyers for a commission. That
shopbot would function as a trusted seller proxy. It would
have all available information to make optimal pricing de-
cisions to maximize its own commission and seller revenue
from selling product price information.
The model we presented in this paper is actually a some-
what simpli¯ed version of reality. In fact, selling product
price information might actually make the seller worse o® if
the pricing is not done carefully: As we saw in section 3.1,
it is not guaranteed that the buyer will actually discover the
cheapest seller's price. Thus, the cheapest seller, who would
have captured all shopbot users, had he provided price in-
formation for free, will now make only a fraction of sales and
may end up lowering total revenue.
A solution to this problem would be for the cheapest seller
to price price information cheaply enough so that a ratio-
nal shopper would always request it, even though the sec-
ond lowest price in the market has been discovered. If the
cheapest seller knows that the second lowest price in the
market is q2, then by charging
R q2
0
(q2 ¡ x)f(x)dx ¡ ² for
price information, he makes sure that the buyer will always
eventually discover the lowest price. One Nash equilibrium
of the one-shot game dictates that all other sellers follow by
setting their price information price to the same value as the
cheapest product seller.
In general the expected revenue per buyer, given that N
sellers sell their price information is:
Rbuyer =
Z 1
0
f
(N)
2 (q)p(q)(
1
N
+
1
2
(1¡ 1
N
))dq (3)
given that the cheapest product seller sets information rent
according to the second cheapest product in the market
(
R q2
0
(q2¡x)f(x)dx¡²), and that other sellers pool by charg-
ing the same amount. f
(N)
2 is the second order statistic for
N sellers3. That is because, for every second lowest prod-
uct price q the average revenue per customer is p(q), with
probability 1=N (corresponding to the case where the seller
is the cheapest product price seller and will de¯nitely sell
his price information) plus p(q), with probability 1
2
(1¡ 1
N
),
which corresponds to the case where the seller is not the
cheapest and only half the times his price information will
be requested, before the actual cheapest seller is found.
The expected value that the price information of a product
generates, before the product is sold, in a market of N sellers
that sell their price information is:
Rproduct = N ¢Rbuyer (4)
We have plotted Rbuyer and Rproduct in Figure 1, assum-
ing normal product price distribution, for di®erent number
of competitors and di®erent price distribution standard de-
viations. A seller is always better o®, though, by selling his
price information than giving out price information for free.
This suggests that in our model, no seller will want to reveal
price information for free to a shopbot.
3.3 The shopbot’s problem
It is clear from Figure 1 that the expected cost per cus-
tomer served rises as price dispersion increases | sellers take
advantage of the higher shopper uncertainty about prices.
This means that the shopbot that covers a market with
smaller price dispersion would have better chances in man-
aging to absorb the customers costs in searching for the
3In other words, this is how the second lowest price in the
market is distributed.
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Figure 1: The series represent di®erent standard
deviations of the assumed normal product price dis-
tribution, in dollars. A reservation price of 50 cents
per price quote is assumed for all buyers. The series
that have standard deviation 2.0 correspond to real
internet book price dispersion data.
best price. Shopbots in markets with higher price disper-
sion might ¯nd it di±cult to cover for the shopper's costs
by allocating part of the ¯xed revenue they make by adver-
tising.
4. PRICE INFORMATION VALUE IN THE
REAL WORLD
In the previous section we have calculated the maximum
theoretical value of price information in an electronic mar-
ket. The question that arises is how much of this theoretical
value can actually be realized. We relax our model assump-
tion to address a few important issues.
4.1 Power structure - Sellers, Buyers and In-
termediaries
In section 2.3 we saw that rational price sensitive buyers
will abandon a shopbot that refuses to sell price information
on behalf of a buyer. But real buyers may still prefer to use
the shopbot with the smaller market coverage. This could
be because they only know or trust that particular shopbot
or because they value other services that the shopbot o®ers
to them, like better interface or customization. In this case
the seller would lose sales because his product is not covered
by the shopbot the buyers prefer.
In the case of a \popular" shopbot the intermediary clearly
enjoys market power that allows it to dictate the rules. In
other markets the power group might be the buyers and
they would simply punish any e®ort by a seller or shopbot
to charge for price information.
4.2 Practical and legal considerations
Sellers can theoretically use the information a shopbot
provides to learn about their competitors prices and try to
undercut them, instead of selling their price information.
However this practice may ignite costly price wars and make
sellers worst o®. Selling price information appears to be a
reasonable alternative.
Furthermore, it is not clear at this point whether an open
web site has the right to block search engines and shopbots
from accessing it. However, it seems that at least techno-
logically, the seller will be able to e®ectively forbid shop-
bots from accessing its site, by employing mechanisms that
stop non-human visitors. For example, randomly changing
the user interface from session to session would foil any at-
tempts from shopbots to access web site information. To
our knowledge, none of these practices has been tested in a
legal dispute yet.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Price information is valuable to shoppers who search for
the best deal on the Internet, because considerable price
dispersion exists. Sellers that do not face powerful interme-
diaries would want to sell their price information, earning
substantial additional revenue. Today's dominant model of
shopbot services, where the shopper has free access to the
information might run into di±culties, in markets with high
price dispersion, once multiple sellers demand a payment for
their price information.
The ¯rst seller to charge for price information can set the
price information price so that all rational shoppers would
be willing to pay for it. However, when more than one seller
sells price information, it could be the case that a shop-
per would stop short of requesting a particular seller's price
information. Pricing price information so that it would be
cheap enough for the buyer to always want it (even if the sec-
ond lowest price is known) is a solution that guarantees that
the cheapest product seller will not jeopardize the product
sale, while earning extra revenue from his information.
The value of price information in e-commerce has been
largely neglected by researchers. This value, as was shown
in this paper, cannot be overlooked and could potentially
in°uence the form of future internet markets. We have pro-
posed a simple model which gives a ¯rst estimate of the
value of price information. In future research we intend to
explore the economic and game theoretic issues that arise in
this new world of pricing price information.
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